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The Impact of Cross Listing on Shareholder’s Return: 





   by 
 
Ndubuisi Austin Chukwunyere 
 
 
This paper tests the impact of cross-listing on Canadian mining firm’s shareholder’s 
return. An event study is used to test abnormal return following the announcements of 
cross-listing event on the Frankfurt stock exchange. Cumulative Abnormal return around 
the cross-listing date is used as a proxy to test this impact. 31 Canadian firms that are 
cross-listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange are collected through the period of 1989-
2003 for this study.  
 
Canadian stocks react negatively to cross-listing on Frankfurt stock exchanges around 
the cross-listing date, at the 5% significance level. However over a relative long period 
Cross-listing in the Frankfurt stock exchange showed a less negative market reaction. 
Both reactions are however not significant. The test results support findings of previous 
studies that cross-listing provides some sort of benefit especially over time. 
 
Therefore, Canadian firms considering cross-listing on the Frankfurt stock exchange as 
a way to add value for its shareholders’ should consider it despite the Canadian market 
reaction to this decision. This is because cross-listing provides many other benefits as 
highlighted in our literature review that on the long run will affect its share-price and 
thus shareholders return. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of study: 
 
Fundamentally, a business operates to maximize Shareholder’s return. Therefore 
maximizing shareholder’s return is a major objective of every senior management team. 
This objective not only boosts the confidence of existing shareholders to increase their 
stake in a business but also serves to attract new investors to develop a positive 
perception of the companies’ sustainability and profitability. The drive to satisfy 
shareholder’s wants has made senior management consider different strategies. One 
popularly considered is known as cross-listing. This can be defined as a situation 
whereby firms choose to list their shares on one or more foreign stock exchanges in 
addition to its domestic stock exchange. This does not only meet shareholders wants as it 
were but gives the company a new status as an international firm which most 
management of firms want to attain. This strategy is widely considered among most start 
up and middle sized companies management. 
The question which now arises is does cross listing actually affect existing shareholder’s 
return? 
This paper examines the impact of cross listing on shareholder’s return using a sample of 
Canadian mining companies cross listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange. We investigate 
if this impact occurs over a relatively short period or a relatively long period. In addition, 
the paper discusses various theories and management motives behind management’s 






The Commodity market is a market that would continue to thrive in the near future 
considering the demand for various commodities especially hard commodities such as 
gold and diamond. These commodities are viewed as alternative investments for portfolio 
diversification .This puts companies involved in the exploration and production of these 
commodities on the spot light for market, financial analysts and investors’ scrutiny and 
valuation. Risk adverse investors despite the volatility of commodity prices still would 
want to buy the shares of companies trading the commodities 
From the stat Canada website, it can be seen that one of the major drivers of the Canadian 
economy is the mining sector and oil and gas industry. These are the third largest 
contributor to the nations GDP .Thus, the need to look closely at the likely benefits for 
purchasing Canadian mining Companies stocks by shareholders. In a bid for management 
to identify different options to ensure that they maximize shareholders wealth, this makes 
them look at cross listing.  
Different Scholars such as Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) propose that there are four 
main benefits derived from cross-listing. They include; market segmentation, market 
liquidity, information disclosure, and investor protection while Sarkissian and Schill 
(2009) stated that firms that cross-list experience valuation gains with the reduction of 
market barriers as well as Karolyi (1998) who report that the share price reacts favorably 
to cross border listing, supporting Sarkissain and Schill(2009) claims. 
3 
 
Scholars gave recommendations of different stock exchanges to cross list that would have 
the greatest positive impact on Shareholder’s return. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2009) 
proposed New York as the most competitive exchange for firms to cross-list. However 
the number of companies that choose to cross-list on London exchange has increased 
significantly since 2001.Based on this premise we claim that the size of the exchange is a 
factor that management considers when deciding to cross list. 
Recent statistics from the world federation of exchanges show the Frankfurt stock 
exchange is among the top 10 stock exchanges in the world and reports from the 
Frankfurt stock exchange show them as an exchange of choice for companies in 
emerging economies. This is because of the ease companies get to list on the exchange as 
well as the liquidity it provides their stocks. This explains why companies from different 
part of the world see the Frankfurt stock exchange as a good choice. 
Above all, a very important question still remains to be answered and that is, does cross 
listing on this exchange affect shareholders return? This is the focal point of this research. 
1.3 Outline: 
 
This paper is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1; gives an overview of cross listing as it 
relates to this paper and the purpose of carrying out this research. Chapter 2; presents a 
review of literatures pertaining to cross listing and its various implications. In addition, to 
other researchers empirical test result and evidences. Chapter 3; describes our data and 
explains our research methodology. Chapter 4; illustrates and provides an analysis of our 





Chapter 2-Literature Review: 
 
2.1 Introduction and outline: 
 
McKenzie 2008 quarterly report (as cited in Dodd 2011) brings to our attention the 
globalization and integration of the world financial markets, and in particular, significant 
capital market developments such as the introduction of the Euro in the European Union 
in 1999, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the introduction of the Alternative 
Investments Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange in 1996 characterized by low 
disclosure requirement in addition to easy access to capital.  
All this has been identified to cause debate among academicians and practitioners 
concerning the motivations for, and the benefits of, cross-listings. This adds to the 
considerable attention the decision of cross listing had drawn in the last three decades. 
Therefore we arrange the literature review of this MRP to follow the outlined 
subheading: 
2.2 Why do firms cross list? 
 
Dodd (2011) reports that managerial surveys and the literature on the determinants of 
cross-listing decisions indicate that an international cross-listing is often an integrated 
part of the company’s global business strategy .This is according to King and Mittoo 
study. Often times firms that recently went public, and more export-oriented companies 
choose to list their shares on a foreign exchange to signal to markets various stakeholders 
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that the company has become a global player. Furthermore, (Bancel and Mittoo 2001) 
suggests that cross-listing is considered to be a means of internationalizing the investor 
base in line with the international profile of the firm’s operations and thereby accessing 
the foreign equity capital needed to finance investment opportunities. 
Consider the findings of Mittoo (1992) as well as Bancel and Mittoo (2001). Together 
these papers survey the managers of European and Canadian firms listing in the Unites 
States. Both sets of managers cite very similar reasons for cross-listing, but the reasons 
for listing differ in their relative importance for both sets of managers. European 
managers, who were surveyed much later, cite “increased liquidity, prestige and image” 
as the most important benefit from listing in the United States, in addition to expansion of 
shareholder base and interest by foreign investors, “increased access to foreign capital 
markets/financing ability,” “facilitated implementation of the global strategy,” and 
“enhanced stock performance/stock liquidity.” Despite these benefits about 12 percent of 
managers still believe that a cross-listing adds no value to the firm.  
The desire for “increased liquidity, prestige and image” is consistent with Fuerst (1998) 
and Moel study (as cited in Dodd 2011) who propose that firms are motivated to cross-
list as a means for them to communicate their private information, and thus signal their 
quality to the market. Although (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001) states that managers may be 
motivated by such considerations as the improved prestige, image and visibility of their 
company to customers and investors.  Chouinard and D’Souza study (as cited in Dodd 
2011) states the primary financial objective of a foreign listing is a” reduction in the 
company’s costs of capital and, accordingly, improved corporate valuation”. 
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Despite the likely benefits of cross-listing, not every company wants to cross-list. This is 
because of the costs involved in cross-listing. Some clearly identified by Cheol S. et al as 
cited in the text International Financial Management, Canadian perspectives include: 
a. It can be costly to meet the disclosure and listing requirements imposed by the 
foreign exchange and regulatory authorities;  
b. Once a company’s shares are traded in overseas markets, there can be volatility 
spillover from those markets;  
c. Once a company’s shares are made available to foreigners, they might acquire a 
controlling interest and challenge the domestic control of the company. 
2.3 Developments in cross-listing 
 
At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, firms wanting to pursue a cross-listing 
abroad had many options. Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) document how, over time, 
exchanges from 34 countries have hosted international (pure exchange-traded) firms. 
This number has risen dramatically over time. In the first decade of the 1900s, firms 
cross-listed on five exchanges (Belgium, France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom). By the 1950s, the number of host exchanges had risen to nine 
(including Austria, Canada, Luxembourg, and the United States), and to 14 in the 1970s 
(now including Australia, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore). Substantial growth 
has occurred since the 1970s from 16 host exchanges in the 1980s, to 24 in the 1990s, 
and finally to 30 in 2000s. The last two decades have also witnessed the entry of new host 
markets. In the 1990s, firms cross-listed in Brazil, Denmark, Hong Kong, Italy, Norway, 
Peru, South Africa, and Spain for the first time. Since then, Argentina, Finland, Israel, 
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Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Taiwan, and the United Arab Emirates have joined the host 
market ranks. In total, these 34 exchanges have accommodated 3,683 cross-listing firms 
over time. The largest exchanges have been the United States (1415), followed by the 
United Kingdom (494), Luxembourg (285), France (208), Germany (193), and 
Switzerland (176) (Sarkissian and Schill, 2009a). 
Despite the growth in the number of host exchanges, a relatively small number of 
exchanges have consistently dominated the host cross-listing market. For example, in the 
last decade of the 20th century, 30 international exchanges hosted just fewer than 800 
firms. These listings have been concentrated in the top six markets: the United States 
(367), United Kingdom (71), Luxembourg (118), Canada (58), Italy (19), and France 
(18). Collectively, these countries account for almost 82 percent of all listings in that 
decade. In short, while the number of host exchanges has risen over time, listing activity 
is concentrated in a small number of exchanges. Second, since the 1950s, the top six host 
markets have attracted between 78 percent and 94 percent of the entire number of 
listings. Furthermore, only 12 distinct host markets have occupied the top six host market 
positions since the 1950s: the United States and the United Kingdom (every decade); 
France (five decades); Switzerland (four decades); Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands, (three decades); Germany (two decades); and Canada, Italy, Japan, and New 
Zealand (one decade each). 
Among the 12 dominant host markets, considerable variation in rankings exists over time. 
This is consistent with the notion that cross-listing activity occurs in waves in different 
markets. That is, the relative attractiveness of each exchange changes over time, and in 
specific periods, some exchanges are more popular than others. Although the United 
8 
 
States has been the top host cross-listing market for the last three decades, this has not 
always been the case. In the 1950s, the United States ranked a lowly sixth, behind 
Belgium in first place. France occupied the top market position in the 1960s and the 
United Kingdom held this distinction in the 1970s. Cross-listing wave activity is also 
evident with the popularity of Japan in the 1980s and more recently New Zealand in the 
1990s. 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) suggest that cross-listing waves partly result from superior 
relative financial/economic performance in the host market. In this regard, France in the 
1960s, Japan in the 1980s, Luxembourg in the 1950-1970s, and the United States in more 
recent years all owe their popularity to their economic/financial health. Also, albeit 
inadvertently, the Unites States and the United Kingdom have benefited from governance 
reform measures in home markets in terms of attracting cross-listed firms. Since firms are 
more (less) likely to cross-list in countries with high (low) levels of investor protection 
(disclosure requirements), governance reforms at home render cross-listings in smaller, 
less regulated markets futile for these firms. Thus, firms are more likely to cross-list on 
U.S. and U.K markets because they offer the highest level of investor protection, all else 
being equal. The top host markets are not universally popular, but owe their popularity to 
the patronage of one/two home markets. Belgium owes its popularity in the 1950s to U.S. 
and Canadian firms, and the United Kingdom to South African mining firms. Without 
such support, the share of foreign listings in Belgium and the United Kingdom would 
have dropped from 21.1 percent to 3.6 percent and 19.3 percent to 9.7 percent, 
respectively. The Netherlands and Switzerland also owe their popularity in the same 
period to U.S. firms. In the 1960s, U.S. and Belgium firms predominantly favored France 
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while the United Kingdom owed its popularity to U.S. and South African firms. In the 
1970s, together with U.S. firms, Irish firms helped popularize cross-listings in the United 
Kingdom. In the 1980s, Canadian, Israeli, and U.K. firms helped to maintain the position 
of the United States as the top host market. In the same years, U.S. and U.K. listings 
largely determined Japan’s popularity. Finally, in the 1990s, the wave of emerging 
market listings helped to maintain the position of the United States and the United 
Kingdom as the top host markets. Canadian firms still listed predominantly in the United 
States, while Australia owed much of its popularity to listings by firms from New 
Zealand (Sarkissian and Schill, 2009a). 
Home market cross-listing activity has also varied over time. The largest patrons of host 
markets have been Canada (651), followed by the United States (551) (despite a fall off 
in patronage in recent times), the United Kingdom (285), Japan (234), and Australia 
(172). In fact, the drop in U.S. patronage partly explains why some countries such as 
Belgium no longer occupy the top six host market positions as they previously had done. 
The same countries have tended to dominate both host and home markets. 
Much of the growth in the cross-listing market has occurred since the 1970s. Since then, 
the cross-listing market has grown considerably, rising from 255 listings in the 1970s to 
741 in the 1980s and then to 1,550 in the 1990s. During the first decade of the 21st 
century, the number has fallen to 797. Cross-listings by Canadian firms rose from 16 in 
the 1970s to 177 in the 1980. For U.S. firms over the same period, cross-listings rose 
from 80 to 181. Between the 1980s and 1990s, listing rose as follows: Australia from 33 
to 102 firms; Ireland from 10 to 45 firms; Israel from 20 to 90 firms; the Netherlands 
from 19 to 69 firms, and the United Kingdom from 65 to 130 firms. Only the United 
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States and Japan contributed less to overseas listings in the same period, decreasing from 
181 to 101 firms and from 83 to 71 firms, respectively. 
These listings also reveal sizable “proximity preferences,” as evidenced by Sarkissian and 
Schill (2004). This partly explains why Irish firms list in the United Kingdom, Canadian 
firms list in the United States, and New Zealand firms list in Australia. U.S. firms 
dominate listings in Canada. Firms from Hong Kong are the largest single group of firms 
listing in Japan. Geographically-close Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands dominate cross-listings in Germany. In short, these examples show that the 
home bias plays an important role in cross-listing. 
Having said this, an argument proposed recently as cited in Dodd 2011 suggests that 
while European markets have improved their quality and attractiveness to foreign 
companies, the US is potentially losing its competitive edge, particularly after the 
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which has significantly increased the 
costs of a US listing (see, for example, Zingales, 2007; Yallapragada et al, 2008). Marosi 
and Massoud (2008) explicitly argue that foreign companies fled the US market due to 
reduction in net benefits of a US cross-listing after the adoption of SOX. Overall, there is 
recent evidence that a significant number of companies still choose to have their shares 
listed on foreign exchanges and also at the same time, a number of companies choose to 
delist their shares from foreign exchanges 
*culled from O’conner,T. &  Phylaktis, K.(n.d),Chapter 12:Cross listing behaviour and Dodd, O. 




2.4 Theoretical concepts influencing cross listing decisions  
 
From the introduction of this MRP and earlier discussed section of this literature review 
we can see clearly that cross-listing is a managerial decision supported by existing 
shareholders. However, it is important to identify the underlining theories that affect this 
“managerial decision”. According to Dodd (2011), the following theories were identified 
which aims to explain the effect of cross listing on shareholder’s return. These theories 
are related to Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009), Bris, Cantale, Hrnjic and Nishiotis 
(2011), and Lee (1991) various view on motivating factors for firms to cross-list: 
2.4.1 Capital market segmentation theory 
 
Dodd (2011) suggested that “cross-listing makes a company’s stocks accessible to 
investors who would otherwise find it less advantageous to hold the stocks because of 
investment barriers”. “In turn, improved stock investability after the cross-listing 
increases the shareholder base and the risk sharing and, thus, leads to a lower cost of 
capital”. Prior to Dodd report, Subrahmanyam in his study(as cited in Dodd 2011) offers 
analysis of the imperfections in international capital markets, and shows that cross-listing 
is one of the corporate financial policies that overcome the effects of capital market 
segmentation and, accordingly, results in a higher price of cross-listed stock. In other 
words, cross-listing makes stock more marketable to investors thus potentially increasing 
the demand for the shares since foreign investors from other countries can easily buy 
shares of companies not originally from their country and the company cross-listing its 
shares believe that other exchanges will give additional return to shareholders as a result 
of its cross-listing activity. This theoretically affects the price of the stock positively. 
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A number of empirical studies (Alexander et al, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1993; Miller, 
1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000) provide empirical evidence consistent with the market 
segmentation theory on the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. 
2.4.2 Legal bonding theory 
 
As discussed in Dodd (2011), Cross listing on an exchange with stricter legal and 
disclosure requirement compared with the home market of the stock cross-listed is a way 
to “bond” the company to better corporate governance practises thus providing better 
protection to minority shareholders. 
According to studies by Reese and Weisbach and Doidge (as cited in Dodd 2011), it was 
proposed that cross listing in the United States provided protection to Shareholders and 
reduced the extent to which Controlling shareholders might want to take advantage of 
private contact to management for their own selfish benefit. As a result this increases the 
company’s growth prospects through access to external investment. 
Furthermore, King and Segal (2004) studied the bonding hypothesis specifically for 
Canadian firms that were cross-listed in the U.S. The results showed that only Canadian 
firms that were actively traded in the U.S. got higher firm valuation gains compared with 
Canadian firms that were only listed on Canadian stock exchanges. 
2.4.3 Signaling theory 
 
This can be compared to the improved investor recognition and market visibility concept 
that was identified as one of the motivating factors for firms to cross list. According to 
Dodd (2011), “the Legal bonding theory is closely related to signalling theory in terms of 
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the effects of foreign listings on shareholders’ wealth”. Fuerst study (as cited in Dodd 
2011), “in an attempt to explain the increase in the number of listings by foreign 
companies on American stock exchanges with strict disclosure requirements in the 1990s, 
developed a theoretical model that rationalises the choice to cross-list on exchanges with 
high disclosure levels”. Fuerst argues that voluntarily bonding to higher levels of 
disclosure via a cross-listing is a way for managers to convey information to the market 
about the firm’s future prospects and quality. Since a cross-listing on an exchange with 
strict disclosure requirements signals superior operating performance in the future, the 
market reaction to the cross-listing decision is predicted to be strongly positive. 
2.4.4 Investor Recognition theory 
 
The classic assumption of asset pricing is that markets are efficient, i.e. all information is 
costless and immediately available to all investors. However, in reality the process of the 
acquisition and dissemination of information in financial markets is complicated and 
costly. By listing shares on a foreign exchange, companies increase investor awareness 
abroad and make information about the company more easily accessible by foreign 
investors, which significantly reduce investors’ monitoring costs. Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri’s (as cited in Dodd 2011) theoretical model predicts a positive effect on 
shareholders’ wealth from a cross-listing decision, given that following the cross-listing, 
investors can produce information about the company at a lower cost. To understand this 
clearly empirical evidence on the information environment of cross-listed companies 
shows that non-US companies cross-listed in the US enjoy an increase in media attention, 
analyst coverage and forecast accuracy following the cross-listing and the increase in 
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visibility is associated with a decrease in the cost of capital after the cross-listing. This is 
according to Baker et al and Lang et al study (as cited in Dodd 2011) 
2.4.5 Proximity preference theory 
 
Sarkissian and Schill study (as cited in Dodd 2011) argue that “corporate financing 
decisions, like portfolio investments decisions, are biased towards domestic assets, i.e. 
they exhibit a ‘home bias’”. More precisely, their study shows that geographical, 
economic, cultural, and industrial proximity measures are important determinants of the 
corporate decision to cross-list. Furthermore, Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) provide 
evidence that wealth benefits are higher for cross-listings on markets that are already 
familiar with the company’s home market’s products (measured by cross-border export) 
and that are relatively close geographically (measured by the distance between the 
capitals).Thus Dodd claims that; 
The expectations of the impact of a cross-listing on shareholders’ wealth based on 
proximity preference theory are the opposite of the expectations that arise from investor 
recognition theory. While investor recognition theory implies the greatest wealth gains 
for shareholders’ occur when the host market is least familiar, due to the need to 
overcome higher information barriers, proximity preference theory implies the greatest 
benefits occur when the host market is most familiar. 
2.4.6 Market timing theory 
 
Henderson study (as cited in Dodd 2011) appraises how market-level conditions impact 
corporate capital raising decisions and find proof that companies issue equity in ‘hot’ 
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markets in order to take advantage of soaring market valuations. Sarkissian and Shill 
(2009b) show that companies tend to cross-list in ‘hot’ host markets, i.e. when the host 
market outperforms other markets economically (in terms of GDP growth) and 
financially (in terms of growth in market capitalization-to-GDP ratio). This is also what 
Fernandes and Giannetti (2008) find. Thereafter, Sarkissian and Schill as well as 
Fernandes and Giannetti relate cross-listing attractiveness to market timing. Firms are 
more likely to list in countries where the magnitude of the (temporary) valuation gains is 
highest. Since market timing, by definition, only delivers short-term value gains, long-
term gains from cross-listing are likely to manifest through a combination of bonding, 
enhanced liquidity, improvements in a firms information environment, and a larger 
shareholder base.  
Therefore the studies of market timing theory supports Dodd’s proposition that 
;Corporate managers’ time the company’s listing on a foreign exchange to take advantage 
of high market valuation at the stock-level, i.e. listing following a strong stock 
performance on the home market. Also managers time a foreign listing at the market-
level, in other words, listing during a ‘hot’ market period 
2.4.7 Business strategy theory 
 
According to Dodd (2011) Business strategy theory predicts “the impact of cross-listing 
on shareholders’ wealth to be a function of company-specific factors, because companies 
make the decision to cross-list for reasons related to their global corporate strategy”. 
Pagano study (as cited in Dodd 2011) shows that companies tend to cross-list on markets 
where their industry peers are listed, which can be attributed to cross-listing companies 
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attempting to strengthen their competitive position in their industry. Fanto and Karmel 
(1997) and Bancel and Mittoo (2001) conduct Surveys of corporate finance managers on 
the benefits of cross-listings. Results reveal industry-specific reasons and a company’s 
global business strategy are among the main reasons to cross-list. Bancel et al (2007) 
provide empirical evidence that emphasises the importance of the business strategy 
theory in explaining the stock performance of cross-listed companies. 
In conclusion, Dodd (2011) suggests; 
Predictions of legal bonding, liquidity and investor recognition theories are similar as 
they all suggest that a cross-listing in a better quality market than the home market is 
beneficial for investors. In each theory, however, market quality is assessed from a 
different angle: legal bonding theory addresses the level of investor protection, liquidity 
theory the level of market liquidity, and investor recognition theory the quality of the 
information environment. Empirically, more developed financial markets offer high levels 
of investor protection, liquidity and information availability, and, ultimately lower 
transaction costs. This fact makes an empirical test of joint significance of the theories 
related to the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth a challenging task. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that market segmentation and proximity preference 
theories make opposite predictions. Market segmentation theory suggests that the 
benefits of cross-listing would be higher because of the need to overcome more 
significant levels of segmentation between the home and the host markets. In contrast, 
proximity preference theory expects that the benefits would be higher from cross-listings 
in host markets that have a high level of similarities and connections with the home 
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market. Lastly, market timing and business strategy theories predict a significant 
variation in the effects of cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth based on both market 
conditions and company-specific factors. 
2.5 Empirical evidences on the effect of cross listing on shareholders’ return 
 
2.5.1 Cross-listings in the US 
 
Listing in the US by a foreign company usually takes place in the form of an American 
Depository Receipt (ADR). American exchanges offer listing companies a number of 
benefits including high liquidity, a large investor base, analyst and media coverage, 
greater access to capital and a high level of investor protection. Not surprisingly, the 
empirical evidence shows that in the 1980s and 1990s non-US companies listing in the 
US, on average, experienced a significant positive abnormal return. 
Miller (1999) examines the stock price reaction around the cross-listing announcement 
dates for 181 companies from 35 countries that instituted their first Depository Receipt 
programme over the period 1985-1995. Miller (1999) finds a positive abnormal return of 
1.15% for a 3-day (-1, +1) event window around the announcement of an ADR-issuance. 
Importantly, the stock price reaction is determined by the listing venue (exchange vs. 
OTC), home market (emerging vs. developed), and avenues for raising capital (public or 
private). Abnormal return is found to be higher for companies from emerging markets 
(1.54%) and significantly higher for exchange listings (2.63%) compared to OTC listings 
and private placements. Miller (1999) interprets his findings as being consistent with the 
argument that higher liquidity and a larger shareholder base increase shareholder wealth. 
Later, Coffee (2002) interprets the findings of Miller (1999) as evidence for the legal 
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bonding theory. Coffee (2002) argues that this difference in price reaction on the 
announcement day of different type of listings is important evidence because exchange 
listings, Rule 144a private placements and OTC listings have critical differences in legal 
and reporting requirements. 
Lee (2003) reports significant abnormal returns of 1.7% for a 3-day (-1, +1) event 
window and 3.3% for a 7-day (-5, +1) event window for a sample of 69 companies from 
11 Asian and Latin emerging markets that cross-listed in the US via ADR programs from 
1991 to 2001. Lee (2003) shows that the excess returns are unrelated to the degree of 
integration between a company’s home stock market and the US stock market. He argues 
that the value effects are mostly due to an improvement in the company’s ability to take 
advantage of growth opportunities. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) examine stock price behaviour around the first-time US 
listings of 153 companies from Canada, Europe and the Asia-Pacific Basin region from 
1976 to 1992. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) find a prelisting run-up in prices, defined as 
the average daily abnormal returns for the (-49, -10) days event period, are 0.095 % 
(t=2.28). Around the day of listing the average daily abnormal returns are as high as 0.35 
%. Overall, cross-listing companies earn CARs of 19% during the year before listing, and 
an additional 1.20% during the listing week, however, they incur a loss of 14 percent 
during the year following the listing. In general, the findings of Foerster and Karolyi 
(1999) are consistent with the liquidity and investor recognition theories on the effects of 
cross-listings on shareholders’ wealth. A more recent study by Bris et al (2007) uses a 
relatively small sample of 20 non-US companies with dual-class shares cross-listed in the 
US and reports positive and significant annualized average daily abnormal return of 
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1.32% for the domestic share class and 0.62% for the US-listed share class during the 50 
day period prior to the cross-listing event. The findings of Bris et al (2007) mainly 
support market segmentation theory. 
2.5.2 Cross-listings outside of the US 
 
In Serra study (as cited in Dodd 2011), a study was done to compare the impact on stock 
price as a result of cross-listings by non-US companies in the US and in the UK. The 
study examined the stock returns of 70 companies from 10 emerging markets and a 
control sample of 65 European companies from mature markets, around cross-listings in 
the US (NYSE & NASDAQ) and London (SEAQ-I) over the period 1991-1995. The 
study provides evidence that there are significant positive abnormal returns before listing 
and a significant decline in returns over the first five weeks following the listing. In 
conclusion Dodd reports that the evidence provided could be supportive of market 
segmentation theory. This study reports that, for companies from emerging markets, 
listing in the UK has the same effects on shareholders’ wealth as listing in the US. 
However, for companies from mature markets, the positive impact on shareholders’ 
wealth is limited to NYSE listings. 
Bris et al (2009) investigate abnormal returns around cross-listings on the London stock 
exchange. Using a sample of 273 stocks including both stocks listed on the LSE and 
stocks admitted to trade on SEAQ, this study finds positive significant abnormal returns 
for the period (-20, 20) days around the listing/trading date for the stock exchange listings 
but not for the admissions to trade. Bris et al (2009) argue that the main source of value 
20 
 
creation around cross-listings is greater information disclosure. 
 
Sarkissian and Schill (2009a) examine monthly stock returns during (-120 months; +120 
months) around foreign listings for more than 1500 listings placed in 25 host countries 
based on the listing status as of December 1998. Firstly, they control for the order of the 
firm’s foreign listing and report that the first listing is associated with unique effects on 
shareholders’ wealth (at least transitory) while multiple listings yield diminishing gains. 
Secondly, they report substantial stock price run-up prior to cross-listing and a profound 
post-listing decline in returns in the long run, which is consistent with market timing 
theory. Nevertheless, they find a permanent change in a firm’s cost of capital of about 2 
percent that can be predominantly explained by cross-product market trade and investor 
familiarity. In other words, the long-term gains from a foreign listing are greater for firms 
listing on foreign markets that are geographically, economically, and culturally closer to 
their home market. The authors suggest that listing on American exchanges does not offer 
unique benefits to foreign firms in terms of shareholders’ wealth. 
Roosenboom and vanDijk (2009) carried out a study on market reaction to cross-listing 
using firms from 44 different countries cross-listed on eight major stock exchanges from 
1982 to 2002. Their report showed that firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges had the 
highest abnormal return at 1.3% on average. The next exchange that recorded abnormal 
return was London stock at 1.1% on average. This was followed by exchanges in 
Continental Europe that recorded 0.6% return. However, there was no significant 
abnormal return for firms that cross-listed in Tokyo. 
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This result finds evidence consistent with improved disclosure and bonding creating 
value for cross-listings on US exchanges, while overcoming segmentation and bonding 
are associated with higher announcement returns on the London Stock Exchange. The 
evidence is mixed for continental European exchanges and for Tokyo. Our results 
highlight the role of the destination market in value creation around cross-listings. 
From the reviewed literatures, an inference can be made that based on the level of 
development in the US economy and the size and role of its capital markets in the global 
financial system, the effect of cross-listing on stock prices could be significantly different 
from cross-listing on other stock exchanges in the world. Regardless of the fact that only 
few studies have looked at cross-listing on exchanges outside of the United States. This 
supports Dodd suggestion that: 
“Overall, there is empirical evidence that, on average, international cross-listings create 
wealth for shareholders. However, the evidence on the sources of the net benefits of 
cross-listings, particularly on markets outside of the US, is inconclusive”. 
2.5.3 Cross-listings effects and Canadian stock price reactions 
 
Many Canadian firms choose to cross-list in the U.S. As a result, a number of studies 
examine listings in the US by Canadian companies. However, it is important to remember 
that there are several different stock exchanges to choose from in the U.S. This raises the 
question, if the U.S exchange of choice has any significant effect on the Canadian firms’ 
stock price? According to Kryzanowski and Lazrak study (as cited in Shi 2012), they 
claim that there is no significant effect in terms of liquidity. 
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Canadian companies list on the US exchanges directly as opposed to issuing ADRs. 
Moreover, the Canadian and the US markets have been geographically, economically and 
culturally integrated for some time. Despite this observable market integration, the 
studies of Doukas and Switzer (2000) and Mittoo (2003) report that Canadian companies 
experience significant positive price effects from a cross-listing in the US. Doukas and 
Switzer (2000) conduct a joint test of changes in the degree of capital market integration 
through time and of changes in risk premium for the sample of 79 Canadian stocks over 
the period 1985-1996. They find significant positive announcement effects during the (-
120; +60) day period around a US listing announcement. Significant abnormal 
performance is observed mainly in the listing announcement period and, particularly, 
during the 60 trading days prior to the listing (31.06% on an annualized basis), whereas 
no significant effects on shareholders’ wealth are found around the listing dates. Doukas 
and Switzer (2000) argue that their findings are consistent with the view that an 
international listing increases the investor base of the firm with beneficial effects on its 
cost of capital. The results also showed increased liquidity and investor recognition for 
the cross-listed firms. In addition, the authors stated that there still existed market 
segmentation between Canada and the U.S. Mittoo (2003) investigates short- and long- 
run effects on shareholders’ wealth of direct listings in the US of 56 Canadian companies 
over the period of 1976-1990 and of 108 companies over the period of 1991-1999. The 
short-run performance analysis for the 7-day (-3,3) day event window around the listing 
date provides evidence of positive price effects, with the price effects being smaller in the 
post-1990 period compared to the pre-1990 period. The long-run performance analysis 
shows that cross-listed companies significantly under-perform Canadian market indices, 
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yielding negative cumulative abnormal returns of -10.53% during the three years 
subsequent to a US listing. Mittoo (2003) provides evidence that the determinants of the 
effects of a US listing including liquidity and industry factors, vary cross-sectionally and 
over time. 
King and Segal (2004) used three groups of companies to test the bonding hypothesis of 
cross-listing. The authors tested Canadian firms’ long-term valuation gains using 12-year 
data. There were several reasons why bonding hypothesis could be reflected in Canadian 
firms’ cross-listing activities on U.S. stock exchanges: stricter supervision in the U.S.; a 
higher level of information asymmetry in Canadian firms; and more Canadian firms held 
by controlling shareholders, unlike most U.S. firms which were widely held. The results 
of this paper showed that only Canadian firms with high share turnover in the U.S. 
market got valuation gains in the long-run. Cross-listed Canadian firms which were not 
actively traded in the U.S. market were valued similarly as Canadian firms only listed in 
Canadian stock exchanges. Bonding hypothesis stated that firms’ cross-listing got 
positive market reaction because the firms can offer better investor protection while 
operating in a market with higher standards. The test results of this paper showed that the 
valuation gains of these Canadian firms were due to higher investor protection. 
Under the bonding hypothesis, Canadian firms’ cross-listing in stock exchanges that are 
not considered stricter than Canadian stock exchanges may not get positive market 
reaction. 
Shi (2012), reports that Canadian firms constituted one of the largest groups among 
international companies on London’s AIM. “Canada takes aim” (2007) stated some 
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trends that had been found about Canadian firms’ listing on AIM. Some Canadian firms 
chose to be listed only on AIM instead of being dual-listed on both Canadian stock 
exchange and AIM. Some Canadian technology and natural resource firms chose to list 
on AIM before they went public on stock exchanges in North America. If a Canadian 
firm was only listed on AIM, it was not required to follow disclosure requirements in 
Canada. Listing on AIM had been viewed as training for Canadian firms’ being a North 
American public company (“Canada takes aim,” 2007). 
There is some discussion about Canadian stock exchange markets and AIM of London 
Stock Exchange. Rousseau (2007) compared the Canadian stock exchanges’ 
competitiveness with that of AIM. According to the paper, Canadian stock exchange was 
stricter on information disclosure and corporate governance requirements. On the 
admission perspective, Canadian exchange was rule-based while AIM was principle-
based. The author suggested that while AIM had attracted many firms, including some 




Despite financial research extensively covering the impact of cross-listings on 
shareholders’ wealth, there remains other areas yet to be explored. One of such areas is 
cross-listing trends from the year 2000s considering the adoption of SOX in the US and 
the adoption of the single currency in Europe. Also as seen from the reviewed literatures 
the majority of empirical studies provide evidence on the impact of cross-listing in the 
US, which is significantly different from other major capital markets in terms of 
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disclosure requirements and costs of listing. This makes more research on the impact of 
cross-listing on shareholders return on other exchanges worth considering. 
Bris, Cantale, Hrnjic and Nishiotis (2011) found that cross-listed firms from countries 
with higher accounting standards got lower abnormal return from cross-listing.  
Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2000) stated that firms from developed countries cross-
listed for other reasons such as higher level of market visibility and takeover 
opportunities. Such contradictory cross-listing trends call for further research to explore 
the costs and benefits of international cross-listings in the current conditions for different 

















Chapter 3: Data description and Methodology: 
3.1 Introduction of Research Methodology 
 
An event study has been designed to empirically test whether cross-listing events are 
value enhancing or value destroying activities. If on average market reacts positively to 
cross-listing, then we can reasonably conclude that cross-listing are value enhancing 
activities; vice versa.  
The most important assumption for this study is that Canadian stock market is strong-
form efficient based on EMH, i.e., share prices speedily and accurately reflect all public 
and private information thus no one can consistently beat the market. In addition, we 
choose the cross-listing date as our event date rather than the announcement date.    
3.2 Data description: 
 
As at June 2013, 855 Canadian mining companies were listed on the Frankfurt stock 
exchange. However, for the purpose of this study, 31 mining companies that cross-listed 
on the Frankfurt stock exchange from 1989-2003 was considered. Their cross listing 
dates were obtained from the Thomson Reuters DataStream data base – a comprehensive 
database for global financial research to a wide network of end users. These dates were 
used to define the event date and estimation window for our study. 
In addition, daily stock prices in Canadian dollars around the event date of these 




These data were used to measure the return and test if abnormal return existed as a result 
of the cross listing. 
3.3 Model Design: 
 
This paper seeks to measure the effect on stock price/returns as a result of firms cross 
listing on the Frankfurt stock exchange. Canadian mining companies are the only 
category of firms considered in this paper. This is because we want to verify what caused 
a large influx of them to the Frankfurt Stock market in recent times. From January 2010-
June 2013 records show about 283 Canadian mining firms cross listed on the Frankfurt 
stock exchange.  However, since most of these company shares are penny stocks thus 
increasing greatly its systematic risk exposure as a result of high volatility we will be 
considering the firms that cross listed in the Frankfurt stock exchange and have been 
active for at least 10 years. This is the basis of our sample size. This is to ensure a level of 
stability of the firms. An event study methodology will be employed in this paper to 
measure the impact of cross listing. Cumulative abnormal return will be the proxy to test 
if there were significant effect on shareholder’s return.  
Stata statistical software will be used to analyse the data to identify the impact of cross-
listing on share price and identify if there was a significant effect. 
3.3.1 Estimation Window: 
 
An estimation window is set before the event date. The estimation window is considered 
as a period that is prior the event when the stock prices are expected to behave normally 
without the influence of any external constraints. This period is used to evaluate the 
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normal performances of the prices of the securities of the mining companies. This paper 
chooses a 110-day estimation period which is 110 days before the cross listing date to 30 
days before the event date.  Expected return of the stock prices of the mining firms are 
estimated using the coefficients obtained from the equation below.  
The Market Model is used to estimate how these companies performed relative to the 
performance of the market index (which is the value of αi andβi)  
RI = αi + βiRm +εi              
αi is a measure of the performance of the securities i.e the intercept of the model 
βi is a measure of the performance of the index i.e the slope of the model 
RI is the expected return of the firms  
Rm is the expected return of the market  
εi is the error term.  
The return on S&P/TSX Composite Index was used as the proxy for the market return in 
the market model as the index provides investors with a broad representative benchmark 
for investors expected return. A linear regression was performed to estimate the value of 
αi and βi.  
3.3.2 Event Window  
 
Two event windows were carefully chosen to span across a 11-day period and 21 days 
period .For the 11-day trading period it takes into consideration five days before the cross 
listing date and another five days after the cross listing date. And for the 21 days trading 
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period it takes into consideration 10 days before the cross listing date and another 10 after 
the cross listing date. This is intended to effectively capture the existence of any 
abnormal return on the securities for a relative short and relative long period which could 
be attributed to the event of cross listing. Abnormal return exist if there is an observable 
difference between the actual return of the firm and the estimated return of the firm as 
showed in the equation below: 
ARi = Ri - RI         
ARi is the abnormal return of the firm  
Ri is the actual return in the event window  
RI is the expected return using the Market model.  
Cumulative abnormal is the sum of the abnormal returns in the event period  
CARi = ∑            
CARi = ∑              
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return of the firm.  
3.4 Empirical Test  
 
Cumulative abnormal returns are viewed as the market reaction to the securities of the 
mining firms trading in Canada’s stock market. A positive cumulative abnormal return 
across the firms in the event window confirms that the market believes the cross listing 
decision will create value and thus increase shareholders return, while a negative 
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cumulative abnormal return in the event window suggest a negative perception of the 



















Chapter 4: Empirical result: 
4.1 Market reaction: 
 
An event study of the Canadian stock market reaction to the cross-listing event on the 
Frankfurt Stock exchange was conducted using a regression model that has the 
cumulative abnormal return as the dependent variable with no independent variable. The 
test was carried out considering two different event windows to determine market 
reaction over a short period and relative long period. We calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return for the sample mining firms for these two periods and present the results 
as follows: 
4.1.1 Market reaction over an 11 day event window 
 
The test for cumulative abnormal return showed a negative value of -0.0462377 at a 5% 
level of significance. This means the cross-listing event on the Frankfurt stock exchange 
has a negative impact on the Canadian firms’ stock prices. This give us reasons to 
support empirical studies and evidences that offer other motives behind firms cross-
listing their shares on other stock exchanges apart from their home markets. These other 
reasons can be revised in our literature review in chapter 2.However the P-value is 







Table 1 shows the test results of cumulative abnormal return in the 11 day event window 
period of cross-listing event. 
 
 
 Table 1: Test Result of Cumulative Abnormal Return at 5% level of significance 
4.1.2 Market reaction over a 21 day event window 
 
The test for cumulative abnormal return showed a negative value of -0.1081634 at a 5% 
level of significance. This means over a relatively longer period cross-listing on the 
Frankfurt stock exchange also had a negative impact on the Canadian firms’ stock price. 
However, this value is lower indicating that the impact of the cross-listing event is better 
on average over a longer period of time. In addition the P value is also greater than 0.05 
but less than the P-value for our first test. This suggests that the impact is not that 
significant. Therefore, we can infer that a cross-listing event may affect the share price 
positively over time considering some other factors like the market timing theory as 
discussed in our literature review. 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0462377   .0448983    -1.03   0.311    -.1379322    .0454569
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .24998
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0000
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    30) =    0.00





Table 2 shows the test results of cumulative abnormal return in the 21 day event window 














                                                                              
       _cons    -.1081634   .0623325    -1.74   0.093    -.2354634    .0191366
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .34705
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0000
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    30) =    0.00




Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendation: 
 
From our study and result, cross listing decisions are seen to negatively affect 
shareholders return on an average using cumulative abnormal return as a proxy to test its 
impact on share price. However, it is important to note that this result is specifically for 
cross-listing on the Frankfurt stock exchange. This supports various scholars’ studies 
notably Rousseau (2007) and King and Segal (2004) and contradicts different studies 
empirical result especially concerning cross-listing on the US stock exchange. 
Therefore the need for further research to be done in this area using more recent data and 
increasing the sample firms, while considering different developments in various stock 
exchanges. In the case of the Frankfurt stock exchange, this will include the introduction 
of the Euro currency. These developments are highlighted in detail in our literature 
review. 
Having said this we want to reiterate that although cross-listing events may not directly 
affect stock price positively. However over the long run other benefits such as increased 
liquidity that the firm will have access to tends to increase the firms’ profitability. This 
will indirectly affect Shareholders’ return positively. Since the firm will have more funds 
at its disposal for its business operations that can earn it more profit and thus increase the 
firm’s value and share price simultaneously. This is the argument opined by the Director 
General of the Frankfurt stock exchange and this could be seen as a laudable explanation 
for the large influx of Canadian mining firms that are presently cross-listed on the 
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cc Name crdate 
1000 BARRICK GOLD (FRA) 1989-01-24 
1001 ELDORADO GOLD (FRA) 1996-05-22 
1002 MONETA PORC.MINES (FRA) 1996-07-11 
1003 KINCORA COPPER (FRA) 1996-12-23 
1004 CANARC RESOURCE (FRA) 1997-02-06 
1005 VALENCIA VENTURES (FRA) 1998-01-07 
1006 KINROSS GOLD (FRA) 1998-06-12 
1007 TASEKO MINES (FRA) 1999-11-16 
1008 AGNICO-EAGLE MNS. (FRA) 1999-12-28 
1009 DOMINION DIAMOND (FRA) 1999-12-28 
1010 NXA (FRA) 2000-01-04 
1011 SILVER STANDARD (FRA) 
RES. 
2000-03-14 
1012 KOBEX MINERALS (FRA) 2001-02-22 




1015 CLAUDE RESOURCES (FRA) 2001-07-13 
1016 RED TIGER MINING (FRA) 2001-08-31 
1017 IAMGOLD (FRA) 2001-10-25 
1018 DORATO RESOURCES (FRA) 2001-11-02 
1019 THUNDERMIN RES. (FRA) 2002-04-02 
1020 GOLDCORP (FRA) 2002-06-04 
1021 VISTA GOLD (FRA) 2002-06-20 
1022 GLDN.STAR RES. (FRA) 2002-07-01 
1023 CALEDONIA MNG. (FRA) 2002-07-24 
1024 SAMEX MINING (FRA) 2002-07-30 




1027 COLOMBIA CREST GD. (FRA) 2003-03-28 














                                                                              
       _cons    -.0462377   .0448983    -1.03   0.311    -.1379322    .0454569
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .24998
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0000
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    30) =    0.00
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      31









































                                                                              
       _cons    -.1081634   .0623325    -1.74   0.093    -.2354634    .0191366
                                                                              
cumulative~n        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .34705
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0000
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  0,    30) =    0.00
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